EU member states imported 9.89 million tonnes of LNG from the Novatek-operated Arctic project between January and June 2026. The volume was 18% higher than in the same period of 2025. First-half imports were about 8.38 million tonnes a year earlier, implying an additional 1.51 million tonnes entering the European market in the latest six-month period.
Country concentration and spending on Yamal cargoes
Purchases were concentrated among three EU markets. France imported approximately 3.6 million tonnes, Belgium 2.9 million tonnes, and Spain 2.7 million tonnes. Combined, the three countries accounted for around 9.2 million tonnes, or almost 93% of the reported EU total.
European buyers spent an estimated €6 billion on Yamal LNG during the period. That figure implies an average expenditure of roughly €607 per tonne. The estimate reflects differences in contractual terms, delivery timing and cargo valuation.
Contract structure and terminal role in Europe
The increase is linked to the commercial role of European LNG terminals for Yamal LNG. European buyers retain long-term contractual obligations tied to supply from the Novatek-operated Arctic project. LNG infrastructure in France, Belgium and Spain provides access to large storage facilities, liquid gas markets and onward transmission capacity.
Under current restrictions, Russian LNG can continue to enter the EU via existing long-term contracts, while new short-term agreements are no longer permitted. Customs authorities are expected to verify that imported cargoes meet these conditions .
Regulatory timeline from 2027 and implications for supply replacement
The regulatory framework tightens further from 1 January 2027, when the EU plans to prohibit imports under existing long-term LNG contracts as well . A later prohibition is also expected for Russian pipeline gas, increasing the need for replacement volumes.
The first-half record may align with a period when contracts remain legally executable before restrictions take effect. Buyers have incentives to secure volumes while they can lift under existing arrangements, particularly where alternative procurement could involve higher spot prices, greater shipping costs or less flexible delivery terms.
The shift in supply sourcing would extend beyond Russian exporters. Replacement demand would be met through additional Atlantic and Middle Eastern LNG, pipeline imports from Norway, North Africa and Azerbaijan, storage optimisation and lower consumption . Southeast Europe would face competition for cargoes delivered to Greece, Turkey, Croatia and the wider Mediterranean market.
European gas security is therefore moving into a phase where infrastructure availability is no longer described as the main constraint. The challenge highlighted is replacing commercially embedded supply contracts without creating a new price premium for European industry and power generation.
