The recent capacity auctions for the Vertical Gas Corridor have underscored a significant gap between political aspirations and market dynamics in the energy sector. This corridor, which aims to serve as a strategic energy link between Greece and Ukraine, has drawn minimal interest from gas traders, raising questions about its viability.
In the latest auction, approximately 72 GWh of transport capacity was made available for February; however, only 48 MWh was successfully booked. This booking rate is viewed by market analysts as statistically insignificant. The limited interest primarily stemmed from routes that transport gas from the Revythoussa LNG terminal and the Alexandroupoli FSRU through Bulgaria, Romania, and Moldova towards Ukraine. Notably, alternative pathways originating from Alexandroupoli—the IGB interconnector and TAP pipeline—received no bids whatsoever.
Participation in this auction was notably low, with only a test-level submission from Metlen and one foreign trading company. This lack of engagement reinforces concerns that commercial entities are not convinced of the corridor’s economic feasibility. This outcome starkly contrasts with official narratives that position the Vertical Gas Corridor as a cornerstone of regional energy security and a potential conduit for U.S. LNG supplies into Eastern Europe.
Market fundamentals appear to be working against the corridor’s development. Ukraine, identified as the primary end buyer, is prioritizing access to the cheapest available gas. Moreover, intermediaries are opting for alternative routes that promise better profit margins, particularly given the heightened demand during winter months.
Despite being classified by the European Union as a priority energy project and ongoing commitments to reduce reliance on Russian gas, tangible support for the Vertical Gas Corridor has been scant. EU regulators are currently assessing whether the auction offerings align with existing regulatory frameworks in response to concerns raised by market participants.
Industry stakeholders in Greece are increasingly recognizing that without financial backing, the corridor is unlikely to achieve commercial viability while Russian gas remains part of Europe’s energy mix. Looking ahead to 2027 and beyond, it is anticipated that while this route may take on a secondary role as other corridors reach their limits, it will likely remain a strategic asset with limited appeal in competitive transit markets.
