Southeast Europe is not the largest destination for LNG globally, but it remains exposed to disruptions in worldwide LNG flows. Week 23 was cited as an example of how changes can transmit into regional gas and electricity markets. Around 20% of global LNG trade passes through the Strait of Hormuz, and more than 85% of those volumes normally go to Asian markets.
If flows through the Strait of Hormuz are disrupted, the impact would be reflected in Southeast Europe through gas prices, LNG competition, and power-market marginal costs. The report links the transmission mechanism to how cargo availability changes bidding behaviour across regions. That includes the effect on European pricing when alternative supplies are sought for Asia.
Qatar LNG exposure and implications for European pricing
The immediate focus is on Qatari LNG as a supplier to Asia. Any disruption would require Asian buyers to secure alternative cargoes. Europe’s direct dependence on Qatari LNG has declined to around 8% of total imports, but the risk is described as remaining due to the global nature of LNG trading.
In a global market, if Asian buyers bid more aggressively for cargoes, Europe would need to pay more to attract supply. The report states that European benchmark gas prices may need to rise 40–50% from current levels to secure sufficient LNG if disruptions to Qatari exports persist. It also cites TTF averaging €48.56/MWh during Week 23.
The one-month forward is noted at around €49.335/MWh. Against that baseline, a 40–50% increase would be material for power pricing under the scenario described. The figures are presented as inputs into how gas costs could move into electricity markets.
US LNG constraints and price-led adjustment
The report says US LNG cannot easily fill any gap created by reduced Qatari exports. Export facilities were operating at approximately 94% utilisation, leaving limited spare capacity. As a result, the adjustment mechanism is described as working through price rather than immediate additional supply.
With limited incremental volumes available from US exports, Europe would compete for available cargoes. That competition would push TTF higher according to the report’s framing. The emphasis is on constrained supply response rather than rapid rebalancing through new shipments.
LNG infrastructure and gas-to-power transmission in SEE
For Southeast Europe, the link is described through multiple channels involving regional LNG import infrastructure. Italy, Greece and Croatia are cited as having LNG import assets that affect regional gas balance. During Week 23, LNG inflows to Greece recovered to 860.32 GWh, while Italy received 2,836.03 GWh.
Croatia’s Week 23 inflows are given at 645.30 GWh. The report characterises these terminals as part of the region’s supply-security architecture rather than peripheral infrastructure. It connects changes in LNG availability and pricing with subsequent effects on gas balances across the area.
LNG price increases would feed into gas-fired power generation, with timing tied to system conditions such as evening peaks, low-wind periods and high-demand weeks. In Week 23, Turkish gas-fired power generation jumped by 278.1%, while thermal generation across SEE rose by 24.5%. Under the scenario described, higher gas prices would raise the cost of that balancing response.
Effects on electricity demand sectors and cross-border market links
The report also describes potential impacts for industrial electricity buyers if higher power prices result from marginal pricing set by gas-fired generation. Even companies without direct gas exposure can face higher electricity costs under that mechanism. Sectors listed include steel, aluminium, cement, fertiliser, chemicals and data centres.
The impact is described as potentially varying by market conditions and generation mix. Markets with stronger hydro or lignite availability may be less immediately exposed than gas-heavy systems. Because SEE markets are interconnected, higher prices in Italy, Greece or Hungary can influence flows and spreads across the Balkans.
Maritime chokepoints and regional repricing without direct landing in the Balkans
The report’s central point is that Southeast Europe’s energy security is linked to global maritime chokepoints affecting LNG flows. It states that exposure is not limited to Russian pipeline routes or local storage arrangements. Instead, it highlights LNG cargo competition between Europe and Asia as part of how disruptions translate into regional outcomes.
A disruption in the Strait of Hormuz is described as not needing to land directly in the Balkans to reprice Balkan electricity.
