The gas sector in Southeast Europe (SEE) continues to grapple with a persistent cycle of feasibility studies that fail to transition into actual construction. Despite the presence of numerous concepts, routes, and engineering details, the region lacks the necessary convergence of capital investment, regulatory frameworks, and political commitment required to bring these projects to fruition. This stagnation results in a repetitive pattern where the same initiatives reemerge every few years, updated but never executed.
One prominent example is the Ionian–Adriatic Pipeline (IAP), which has been under consideration for over a decade. Designed to connect Albania’s TAP entry point through Montenegro and Bosnia and Herzegovina to Croatia, the IAP has undergone extensive analytical work. Its nominal design capacity is typically estimated at 5–7 billion cubic meters (bcm) per year, with capital costs fluctuating between €1.8 billion and €2.4 billion based on various factors. However, the project remains unbuilt due to a lack of commitment from anchor shippers willing to guarantee sufficient volumes for debt servicing during initial operational years.
Montenegro’s gasification efforts reflect similar challenges on a national level. The proposed LNG terminal at the Port of Bar is central to this vision, with a projected regasification capacity of 0.5–1.0 bcm per year and an estimated investment of €180 million to €250 million. However, progress is stalled as the government has yet to determine whether gas infrastructure will be treated as a regulated public utility or a merchant asset. This indecision hampers the ability to secure long-term commitments from potential off-takers necessary for financing.
In Bosnia and Herzegovina, the Southern Gas Interconnection project aims to link Croatia’s system with central Bosnia but remains trapped in perpetual feasibility due to governance uncertainties. Cost estimates for this interconnector hover around €100 million to €150 million, while demand projections suggest initial flows could reach 0.5–1.0 bcm per year. Nonetheless, disputes over project ownership and authority have left it stalled, as lenders perceive significant political risks that inflate capital costs.
Serbia’s interconnector with North Macedonia is closer to execution but still exemplifies how projects can stall after completing feasibility assessments. The Serbian section’s capital expenditure is estimated at €70 million to €90 million, with design capacities aimed at future expansion rather than immediate use. The transition from analysis to commitment faces hurdles such as expropriation costs and environmental permits that must be resolved before construction can begin.
Gas-to-power projects in Serbia and Republika Srpska face similar dynamics at the generation level, with planned capacities between 300 MW and 500 MW carrying costs of €250 million to €400 million. However, financial models depend on factors like competitive gas pricing and dispatch priority that are not guaranteed, leading sponsors to continually revise studies instead of addressing underlying risks directly.
The latest studies on hydrogen readiness also follow this trend, demonstrating technical compatibility with existing gas networks but failing to provide a clear path toward financial closure due to absent consumer commitments and regulatory frameworks. These studies serve more as strategic signaling than as actionable plans for construction.
A consistent economic logic emerges from these cases: feasibility studies persist not due to flawed data but because they allow stakeholders to gain political value without incurring financial risks. While studies cost between €0.5 million and €5 million and align with EU objectives, construction demands substantial capital investment and risk acceptance that stakeholders are reluctant to undertake.
Successful projects tend to emerge only when early capital commitments are made alongside formalized system acceptance and revenue certainty through regulated tariffs or long-term contracts. In most SEE gas initiatives, these conditions remain unfulfilled during feasibility phases, resulting in a cycle of indecision that hinders progress.
The cumulative effect is evident across the region: an abundance of sophisticated studies exists while energy security goals remain unmet. Until feasibility in SEE gas projects transitions from optional recommendations to phases requiring irreversible commitments, the region will continue producing documents without achieving tangible outcomes in energy diversification and security.
