Srbijagas has been one of Serbia’s most critical state energy companies in recent years — surrounded by vast promises, political declarations, strategic ambitions and public expectations. It promised financial reform, transparency, infrastructure expansion, supply security, diversification, development of gas power generation and transformation into a modern, EU-aligned market entity. The real outcome sits between achievement and missed opportunity.
First, the achievement: gas supply security was preserved. Despite global crisis, sanctions, the war in Ukraine and turbulent European markets, Serbia maintained stable deliveries. Households were supplied, industries did not shut down, no systemic collapse occurred. For a country without its own gas reserves, this is a major success. In this regard, Srbijagas was a pillar of national stability.
Infrastructure-wise, progress is visible. The Balkan Stream pipeline through Serbia increased supply security and capacity. The grid expanded and gasification reached more regions. Storage — especially Banatski Dvor — improved significantly and proved crucial in crisis seasons. Technically, the company remained functional and resilient.
However, when moving from daily operations to strategic depth, problems emerge. Financial stability — repeatedly promised — remains unresolved. Srbijagas still carries heavy debt burdens, state dependency, opacity, political decision-making and weak corporate discipline. “Reform attempts” exist but have not structurally cured the company. The business model remains politically driven rather than market-controlled.
Diversification remains the most significant unfulfilled ambition. On paper, many alternative supply routes, LNG access and diversification ideas were publicly pushed. In practice, Serbia still overwhelmingly depends on one supplier. In energy, potential is not security. Only built infrastructure counts — and it is still insufficient.
Gas power generation — repeatedly announced as Serbia’s flexible energy future — remains largely conceptual. No major modern gas power plants have been completed to reshape the Serbian power structure. As in EPS, more was spoken than built.
European integration remains half-completed. Serbia is obliged to align with EU energy market rules. Yet Srbijagas has long functioned as a political monopoly rather than a disciplined corporate actor. Unbundling and restructuring started late, progressed slowly and remain incomplete.
The human capital problem mirrors EPS and EMS — insufficient professionalization, weak managerial accountability, political culture outweighing expertise, and lack of generational recruitment.
In conclusion: Srbijagas fulfilled the most important functional task — it maintained supply and infrastructure stability. However, the strategic transformation — financial health, diversification, EU-level corporate discipline, energy development leadership and full professionalization — remains unrealized. Operationally stable, yet strategically unreformed — that is today’s Srbijagas.
