Elektroprivreda Srbije has in the past several years lived through a turbulent period full of major promises, political announcements, strategic plans and serious challenges. EPS promised modernization, increased production, stable supply, energy transition, investment in new capacities, better environmental performance and financial stability. At the same time, Serbia confronted a European energy crisis, climate pressure, new market rules and a rapid reshaping of the energy landscape. In such a reality, the core question is the same: what was promised, what was actually done — and what was not?
EPS did manage, to a degree, to stabilize operations after severe system shocks, especially the 2021/2022 collapse when failures at TENT and poor management nearly paralyzed production. Repairs were carried out, key equipment was restored, overhauls intensified, and the system returned to operational normality. Hydropower, during favorable hydrology, performed strongly. Coal remained the backbone of supply and the system did not collapse. Market-wise, EPS largely avoided continuous import dependency seen at the peak of the crisis. These are real achievements.
But the transformation long promised to society — a modern EPS, efficient operations, environmentally responsible energy giant and a company entering a new era — has not materialized at scale. The thermal fleet remains largely outdated, only partially refurbished. Much of the infrastructure still rests on technology built decades ago. Modernization remains fragmented and reactive rather than strategic. No new major generating capacity has been built to reshape production, whether thermal, hydro or renewable. While others built gas plants, wind and solar fleets, EPS mostly “put out fires”.
On renewables, EPS repeatedly announced entry into wind and solar and expansion of hydropower. In practice, progress has been slow. Private investors and international companies have advanced significantly faster. EPS is only recently engaging more seriously. Transition exists politically, not institutionally.
Environmental commitments remain a weak point. Emissions reduction, flue gas desulfurization, ash management and EU alignment — some projects are completed, many delayed, some still missing. EPS remains a major polluter and progress is slow. Financially, promised efficiency and stabilization clash with past losses, emergency imports, restructuring pressures and the transformation into a joint stock company which is more political than structural. Real reform still depends on professionalization, depoliticization and real accountability.
The human dimension is equally critical. EPS suffers from expert shortages, brain drain, weak attractiveness for new engineers and decades of politically driven appointments. Without a new professional generation, there is no new EPS. That remains the largest unfulfilled promise.
In summary: EPS stabilized survival, but has not entered renewal. It operates more stably than in the crisis years — but it has not become the modern, strategic, investment-driven company Serbia was promised. Serbia is energy-secure mainly because an inherited system survived — not because a new one has been built.
