Serbia today stands at a rare historical turning point in its energy strategy. For more than three decades, nuclear power in the country existed only as a theoretical subject of academic debate, largely overshadowed by a legal prohibition introduced in 1989 in the aftermath of Chernobyl, public fear, and a national power system structurally dependent on lignite coal. That foundation has now begun to shift dramatically. The formal lifting of the moratorium on nuclear power plant construction in late 2024 signaled that Belgrade no longer views nuclear energy as a taboo subject, but as a legitimate strategic option in the long-term redesign of Serbia’s electricity system. The reasons are clear enough: electricity demand is projected to increase significantly over the coming decades, decarbonization obligations are tightening, coal infrastructure is aging, and the pressure to ensure energy security in a volatile geopolitical environment is stronger than ever.
With the legal barrier removed, Serbia has entered an exploratory phase defined by negotiations, feasibility studies, institutional preparation and diplomatic balancing. Rather than committing prematurely to a single supplier or model, Belgrade has taken the opposite approach: engaging multiple potential partners simultaneously, testing their offers, exploring training frameworks and examining financing models before deciding which nuclear pathway is most compatible with Serbia’s economic realities, strategic interests and geopolitical positioning. The result is a complex field of competing proposals and strategic narratives in which Russia, South Korea, France, China and other global nuclear actors all see an opportunity to anchor long-term influence in the Balkans through one of the most politically consequential infrastructure decisions Serbia will make in this generation.
The most visible and politically sensitive track concerns negotiations with Russia’s state nuclear corporation Rosatom. High-level Serbian representatives have acknowledged active, substantive discussions on the potential construction of Serbia’s first nuclear power plant, with indications that both large-scale traditional reactors and smaller modular designs are on the table. Rosatom’s appeal rests on its integrated model. Unlike many Western or Asian nuclear players that specialize in particular parts of the value chain, Rosatom offers something close to a full ecosystem in one package: reactor design and construction, long-term fuel supply, operational support, training, waste management solutions and, crucially, state-backed financing. For a country without existing nuclear infrastructure or mature nuclear institutions, this level of turnkey support can appear strategically reassuring. Russia has successfully deployed similar strategies in other regions, combining engineering capability with diplomatic leverage and relatively attractive credit conditions tied to sovereign cooperation.
If Serbia chose this route, the likely configuration could involve either a large gigawatt-class facility similar to the VVER-1200 reactors constructed elsewhere or the adoption of modular solutions that better align with Serbia’s system size and incremental capacity needs. The flexibility built into Rosatom’s technological portfolio is not insignificant; it allows Serbia to consider different risk profiles and time horizons. However, it is impossible to separate the engineering advantages from the geopolitical realities. Serbia continues to formally pursue European Union accession, and European political structures remain extremely sensitive to deepening strategic dependencies on Russia, especially in critical infrastructure. Any nuclear agreement anchored in Russian technology would have long-term implications for regulatory alignment, financing relationships and energy diplomacy, potentially complicating Serbia’s ability to fully integrate into EU frameworks. Critics of a Rosatom partnership warn that such a decision could bind Serbia into a prolonged technological dependency on a single politically exposed supplier, shaping its sovereignty in the nuclear domain for decades.
Running in parallel to the Russian track is a very different kind of engagement with South Korea’s Korea Hydro & Nuclear Power (KHNP). Serbia has signed memoranda of understanding with KHNP that focus less on immediate plant construction and more on knowledge exchange, workforce training, regulatory capacity building and cooperation on emerging clean-energy technologies, including hydrogen production. This positioning reflects an understanding that nuclear power is not simply about building a station; it is about constructing a culture of nuclear safety, regulation, oversight and technical competence that must precede any engineering activity. South Korea’s experience is particularly valuable in this regard. Over recent decades, KHNP has emerged as one of the world’s most dynamic nuclear exporters, demonstrating credibility not only in domestic deployment but in successful large-scale international projects.
The Korean cooperation initiatives therefore serve multiple functions for Serbia. They create pathways for training a future generation of nuclear engineers, regulators and plant operators. They contribute to shaping institutional readiness that international nuclear governance expects, especially regarding safety protocols and independent oversight. They also introduce modular thinking and modern nuclear design approaches that may align well with Serbia’s medium-scale system, offering an alternative vision to both traditional Western nuclear approaches and the Russian full-package model. Perhaps most importantly, the partnership signals Serbia’s intention not to anchor itself to a single geopolitical bloc, but to diversify its strategic engagements while still progressing toward a more sophisticated nuclear policy foundation.
A third influential actor in Serbia’s nuclear equation is France, whose national utility and engineering ecosystem remains one of the few globally operating long-running nuclear fleets of substantial scale. France has already been involved in Serbia’s early exploratory stage, assisting with technical studies that examine feasibility, regulatory requirements, environmental impacts and grid integration capacity. These engagements are particularly important for Serbia’s broader European orientation. French nuclear expertise is deeply embedded in EU regulatory standards and governance models, and aligning early with French advisory support helps Serbia move in step with European energy policy expectations and safety frameworks.
France represents a distinct model compared to Russia and South Korea. Its strength lies in established large-reactor technology, deep institutional experience and integration into European financing and regulatory ecosystems. However, large French or Western European nuclear builds in recent years have been associated with delays and escalating costs, something that weighs heavily in the considerations of smaller and emerging nuclear states. The question for Serbia is not only whether French technology is technically credible—it undoubtedly is—but whether the scale, timeline and financial structuring of such projects align with Serbia’s economic and political reality. Still, the credibility, European alignment and institutional confidence that a French partnership could provide are significant strategic assets, especially for a country negotiating EU accession while redesigning its energy foundations.
China’s presence in Serbia’s nuclear conversation is less advanced but strategically noteworthy. China has been expanding its nuclear export ambitions globally and has already demonstrated interest in Central Asian and Eurasian nuclear cooperation. For Serbia, potential Chinese involvement represents another avenue of cost-competitive technology, large-scale industrial capacity and state-backed financing options. However, unlike the Russian, French and Korean tracks, Chinese engagement remains less defined, more exploratory and firmly situated within a highly politicized global context. Serbia’s longstanding cooperation with China in infrastructure and industry means that nuclear cooperation is not an implausible evolution, but whether it becomes a leading option will depend on Serbia’s appetite to balance multiple major-power influences in a sector that is arguably more politically sensitive than any other.
Beyond these partner comparisons, it is essential to understand that Serbia is not merely shopping for a contractor. It is engaged in a phased transformation of its institutional, regulatory and strategic architecture. In the immediate period following the lifting of the ban, Serbia’s priority is not announcing a groundbreaking date but building the prerequisites that make nuclear power viable and safe. Over the next several years, the focus is necessarily on establishing independent regulatory institutions, developing legislative frameworks consistent with international nuclear governance, preparing licensing structures, training specialist human resources and continuing comprehensive technical studies to determine realistically what type and scale of plant Serbia can sustain.
If one were to outline a prospective pathway, the mid-2020s represent a preparatory window dominated by analysis, capacity-building and political positioning. As institutional credibility strengthens, perhaps through cooperation with Korean partners on training and with French institutions on regulatory alignment, Serbia will simultaneously deepen negotiations with potential construction partners. During this period, detailed feasibility assessments, comparative technology evaluations, and structured financial discussions will define what kind of nuclear project Serbia could actually commit to without destabilizing its economic stability or geopolitical balance. The late 2020s would likely be characterized by partner selection, formal contracting, financing agreements, environmental assessments and site licensing. Only once this infrastructure is in place could Serbia realistically move toward the symbolic moment of groundbreaking—something that, even under optimistic assumptions, is more likely to occur in the early 2030s than in the immediate future.
From groundbreaking to commissioning is itself a marathon rather than a sprint. Large nuclear projects often take eight to ten years from construction start to operational readiness. Small modular reactors may shorten portions of the timeline, but they still face licensing, infrastructure, manufacturing and integration demands that require rigorous oversight. This means that nuclear energy, even if successfully pursued, will not solve Serbia’s near-term energy dilemmas. It is a strategic bet on the structure of Serbia’s electricity system in the 2030s and 2040s, not a quick policy fix for today’s grid constraints.
The choice of nuclear partner is therefore inseparable from Serbia’s grand strategic trajectory. A Russian partnership offers speed, integrated delivery and strong bilateral financing, but risks entrenching dependency and complicating Serbia’s EU orientation. A South Korean pathway prioritizes institutional maturity, modern technology and technical diplomacy but likely requires a longer preparatory runway. A French or broader European approach aligns Serbia closely with EU energy governance and safety norms, enhancing credibility but potentially exposing the project to European industrial cost dynamics and political processes. A Chinese route would offer industrial muscle and financing alternatives but significantly increase Serbia’s exposure to great-power competition risks.
In truth, none of these choices are purely technical. They are statements of alignment, sovereignty, economic risk tolerance and geopolitical identity. That is why Serbia is moving cautiously. Nuclear energy is not only an engineering project; it is a nation-defining strategic decision whose implications extend into diplomacy, industrial policy, financial security and generational planning. What Serbia is building right now is less a plant and more a platform: a governance platform, a knowledge platform and a strategic platform capable of supporting a nuclear future, if and when it decides unequivocally to proceed.
What emerges from this picture is a Serbia that is not rushing but positioning. The country has shifted nuclear energy from forbidden topic to strategic possibility. It has widened its diplomatic and technological options instead of narrowing them. It is investing in studies, training and institutional preparation, understanding that credibility in nuclear policy is earned through methodical groundwork, not grand declarations.
Ultimately, whether nuclear power becomes a core pillar of Serbia’s future energy system will be determined not by enthusiasm or political symbolism but by decisions made over the next five to seven years. Those decisions must balance cost, sovereignty, technology, safety, environmental stewardship and geopolitical prudence. Serbia has entered the nuclear age not by building reactors, but by beginning a deliberate and highly consequential conversation about its long-term place in Europe’s energy and political architecture. The significance of that decision will echo far beyond megawatts and machinery; it will help define how Serbia secures power, autonomy and strategic relevance in the decades ahead.
